Updated Last:

History of Radar

At the start of World War II both the United Kingdom and Germany knew of each other's ongoing efforts in their "battle of the beams". Both nations were intensely interested in the other's developments in the field, and engaged in an active campaign of espionage and false leaks about their respective equipment. By the time of the Battle of Britain, both sides were deploying radar units and control stations as part of integrated air defense capability. However, German radars could not assist in offensive role and the Luftwaffe did not sufficiently appreciate the importance of British radar stations as part of RAF's air defense capability, contributing to their failure.

Research had been initiated by Sir Henry Tizard's Aeronautical Research Committee in 1935 and, from 1940, was based at the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE). But much of the credit belongs to Watson-Watt, head of the team working at Bawdsey Manor in Suffolk, who turned from the technical side of radar to building up a usable network of machines and the people to run them. After watching a demonstration in which his radar operators were attempting to locate an "attacking" bomber, he noticed that the primary problem was not technological, but worker overload. By 1940 Watt had built up a layered organization that efficiently passed information along the chain of command, and was able to track large numbers of aircraft and direct defenses to them.


Chain Home
Shortly before the outbreak of World War II several radar stations known as Chain Home (or CH) were constructed along the South and East coasts of Britain, based on the successful model at Bawdsey. As one might expect from the first radar to be deployed, CH was a simple system. The broadcast side was formed from two 300 ft (100 ;m) tall steel towers strung with a series of antennas between them. A second set of 240 ft (73 m) tall wooden towers were used for reception, with a series of crossed antennas at various heights up to 215 ft (65 m). Most stations had more than one set of each antenna, tuned to operate at different frequencies.

Typical operating conditions were:

FREQUENCY: 20 to 30 MHz (15 to 10 metres).
PEAK POWER: 350 kW (later 750 kW).
PULSE REPETITION FREQUENCY: 25 and 12.5 pps.
PULSE LENGTH: 20 μs.
The CH radar was read with an oscilloscope. When a pulse was sent out into the broadcast towers, the scope was triggered to start its beam moving horizontally across the screen very rapidly. The output from the receiver was amplified and fed into the vertical axis of the scope, so a return from an aircraft would deflect the beam upward. This formed a spike on the display, and the distance from the left side –measured with a small scale on the bottom of the screen– would give the distance to the target. By rotating the receiver goniometer connected to the antennas to make the display disappear, the operator could determine the direction to the target (this is the reason for the cross shaped antennas), while the size of the vertical displacement indicated something of the number of aircraft involved. By comparing the strengths returned from the various antennas up the tower, the altitude could be determined to some degree of accuracy.

CH proved highly effective during the Battle of Britain, and is often credited with allowing the RAF to defeat the much larger Luftwaffe forces. Whereas the Luftwaffe had to hunt all over to find the RAF fighters, the RAF knew exactly where the Luftwaffe bombers were, and could converge all of their fighters on them. In modern terminology, CH was a force multiplier, allowing the RAF fighters to operate more effectively as if they were a much larger force operating at the same effectiveness as the Germans. In addition, the CH system allowed pilots to rest on the ground instead of flying continuous 'standing patrols', and only needing to 'scramble' (take off) when the air threat was imminent. This not only reduced pilot's workloads, but also reduced wear on engines, as well as reducing unnecessary petrol consumption.

Very early in the battle the Luftwaffe made a series of small raids on a few of the stations, including the Bawdsey research and training station, but they were returned to operation in a few days. In the meantime the operators took to broadcasting radar-like signals from other systems in order to fool the Germans into believing that the systems were still operating. Eventually the Germans gave up trying to bomb them. The Luftwaffe apparently never understood the importance of radar to the RAF's efforts, or they would have assigned them a much higher priority – even a concerted effort would not have had much effect on the transmitters as their structure made them very resistant to blast which passed through the spaces in the metal lattice.

In order to avoid the CH system the Luftwaffe adopted other tactics. One was to approach Britain at very low levels, below the sight line of the radar stations. This was countered to some degree with a series of shorter range stations built right on the coast, known as Chain Home Low (CHL). These radars had originally been intended to use for naval gun-laying and known as Coastal Defence (CD), but their narrow beams also meant they could sweep an area much closer to the ground without seeing the reflection of the ground (or water) –known as clutter. Unlike the larger CH systems, CHL had to have the broadcast antenna itself turned, as opposed to just the receiver. This was done manually on a pedal-crank system run by Women's Auxiliary Air Force until more reliable motorized movements were installed in 1941.


Ground Controlled Intercept
Similar systems were later adapted with a new display to produce the Ground Controlled Intercept stations in January 1941. In these systems the antenna was rotated mechanically, followed by the display on the operator's console. That is, instead of a single line across the bottom of the display from left to right, the line was rotated around the screen at the same speed as the antenna was turning.

The result was a 2-D display of the air around the station with the operator in the middle, with all the aircraft appearing as dots in the proper location in space. These so-called Plan Position Indicators (PPI) dramatically simplified the amount of work needed to track a target on the operator's part. Such a system with a rotating, or sweeping, line is what most people continue to associate with a radar display.


Airborne Intercept
Rather than avoid the radars, the Luftwaffe took to avoiding the fighters by flying at night and in bad weather. Although the RAF was aware of the location of the bombers, there was little they could do about them unless the fighter pilots could see the opposing planes.

This eventuality had already been foreseen, and a successful programme by Edward George Bowen in 1936 (likely at the urging of Tizard) developed a miniaturized radar system suitable for aircraft, the so-called Airborne Interception (AI) set. At the same time Bowen developed radar sets for aircraft to detect submarines, the Air to Surface Vessel (ASV) set, making a significant contribution to the defeat of the German U-boats.

Initial AI sets were available in 1939 and fitted to Bristol Blenheim aircraft, replaced quickly with the better performing Bristol Beaufighter. These quickly put an end to German night- and bad-weather bombing over Britain. Mosquito night intruders were fitted with AI Mk VIII and later derivatives which, along with a device called "Serrate" to allow them to track down German night fighters from their Lichtenstein B/C and SN2 radar emissions, as well as a device named "Perfectos" that tracked German IFF, allowed the Mosquito to find and destroy German night fighters. As a countermeasure the German night fighters employed Naxos ZR radar detectors.


Centimetric radar
The next major development in the history of radar was the invention of the cavity magnetron by John Randall and Harry Boot of Birmingham University in early 1940. This was a small device which generated microwave frequencies much more efficiently than previous devices, allowing the development of practical centimetric radar, which operates in the radio frequency band around 30 GHz. Centimetric radar allowed for the detection of much smaller objects and the use of much smaller antennas than the earlier lower frequency radars, and the cavity magnetron is the single most important invention in the history of radar. It was given free as a gift to the US in 1940 together with several other inventions such as jet technology, partly to encourage them to enter the war on the side of the British. Simultaneously, Robert M. Page invented the duplexer switch at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, allowing a pulse transmitter and receiver to share the same antenna without destabilizing the sensitive receiver.

The combination of the magnetron, the duplexer switch, small antennas and high resolution allowed small high quality radars to be installed in aircraft. They could be used by maritime patrol aircraft to detect objects as small as a submarine periscope, which allowed aircraft to attack and destroy submerged submarines which had previously been undetectable from the air. Centimetric contour mapping radars like H2S improved the accuracy of Allied bombers used in the strategic bombing campaign. Centimetric gun laying radars were much more accurate than the older technology. They made the big gunned Allied battleships more deadly and along with the newly developed proximity fuze made anti-aircraft guns much more dangerous to attacking aircraft. The two coupled together and used by anti-aircraft batteries, placed along on the German V-1 flying bomb flight paths to London, are credited with destroying many of the flying bombs before they reached their target.

The British need to produce the magnetron in large quantities was so great that Edward George Bowen was sent as the radar expert in the Tizard Mission to the USA in 1940, which resulted in the creation of the MIT Radiation Lab to develop the device further. Half of the radar deployed during World War II were designed at the RadLab, including over 100 different radar systems costing $1.5 billion


 
 
Do More
Shop Forum Media